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Abstract Systems based on symbolic knowledge have performed extremely well
in processing reason, yet, remain beset with problems of brittleness in many
domains. Connectionist approaches do similarly well in emulating interactive
domains, however, have struggled when modelling higher brain functions. Neither
of these dichotomous approaches, however, have provided many inroads into the
area of human reasoning that psychology and sociology refer to as the process of
practice. This paper argues that the absence of a model for the process of practise in
current approaches is a significant contributor to brittleness. This paper will
investigate how the process of practise relates to deeper forms of contextual rep-
resentations of knowledge. While researchers and developers of knowledge based
systems have often incorporated the notion of context they treat context as a static
entity, neglecting many connectionists’ work in learning hidden and dynamic
contexts. This paper argues that the omission of these higher forms of context is one
of the fundamental problems in the application and interpretation of symbolic
knowledge. Finally, these ideas for modelling context will lead to the reinterpre-
tation of situation cognition which makes a significant step towards a philosophy of
knowledge that could lead to the modelling of the process of practice.
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Introduction
There have been a number of methods applied to the task of creating the thinking
machine with varying degrees of success. For instance, artificial neural networks
(ANNs) and other function fitting methods have shown great ability at being able to
learn generalised solutions to problems. These systems can provide reasonable
results to previously unseen situations. However, they generally require extensive
and repeated training or calculation to form the required function. Alternatively,
through encoding human knowledge directly, such as a knowledge based systems
(KBSs), extremely accurate classification can be achieved without the need for
repeated training. However, unlike ANNs, KBSs generally completely collapse
when faced with a previously unseen situation. This is particularly clear when they
require knowledge from outside the system’s domain.
The differences between these dichotomous approaches were investigated by
Gaines (2000). He looked at where within the overall framework for human activity,
each group of methods have been applied with the greatest success. Figure 1 shows
a reproduction of Gaines’s (2000) Levels and Worlds of Being diagram, which
attempts to capture the entire conceptual framework for human psychology,
sociology, action and knowledge. The central column of this diagram presents a
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Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for human psychology, sociology, action and knowledge. The central
column shows a three layer model of human entities. The four outer worlds set human entities within the
context of Popper’s (1968) worlds. The boxes on the left of the central region identify various models of
knowledge transfer in relation to the three layers. The boxes to the right of the central core relate the three
layers to various products of human entities. This model is a replication of the levels of worlds of being
model (Gaines 2000, p. 115)
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three layer model of human entities, such as people, companies or governments.
Gaines (2000) claims that connectionist approaches have emulated the interaction
level with increasing effectiveness, while digital computation has done similarly
well with the top brain functions of reasoning.
Gaines’s (2000) investigation into these different approaches found that the
central area concerning the processes of practice is relatively untouched. This paper
is interested in finding an applicable epistemological foundation that goes some way
to filling this gap. This will be achieved by discussing the process of practice and
how it relates to deeper forms of contextual representations of knowledge. This will
include an investigation into current approaches to incorporating context. It is
argued that the omission of these higher forms of context is one of the fundamental
problems in the application and interpretation of symbolic knowledge. These ideas
for modelling context will lead to the reinterpretation of situation cognition which
makes a significant step towards a philosophy of knowledge that could lead to the
modelling of the process of practice. The following sub-sections will define what is
meant by the process of practice and the various types of context discussed. This
will be followed by a brief walkthrough some historical philosophies of knowledge
and the effects they had on the development of KBSs.
The Process of Practise
In human psychology and sociology the process of practice is where the behaviour of
people or organisations’ is not governed by logic or a reflexive response to an event.
Rather, they are ruled by their cultural, mental or social state at the time. For instance,
a person’s habitus, or predisposition to be effected by something (WordNet 2003),
can significantly alter their response to a particular set of facts (Gaines 2000). One
type of habitus, where behaviour is induced by normative rules, such as government
codes or through business operations, has been successfully modelled by KBSs.
However, these can still be problematic as normative rule sets are generally
incomplete and require significant interpretation (Op cit). Gaines (2000) claims that
the failure to adequately model the remaining process of practice is the ‘‘…greatest
impediment to the development of expert systems’’ (Gaines 2000, p. 115).
Currently there are two general groups of approaches whittling away at the
region of practice. Firstly, connectionist researchers have been investigating the
emulation of higher brain functions. Generally, connectionist work has struggled to
develop systems that model higher brain functions as they tend to be mostly reactive
(Gaines 2000). Machine learning methods like temporal difference learning can be
integrated with connectionist approaches providing the ability to spread rewards
over temporally separated events in a generalised form (Sutton and Barto 1998).
This offers the ability to learn some simple actions (Op cit). However, these systems
struggle to learn the amount of knowledge required for complex higher brain
functions, thereby, limiting their effectiveness. Simultaneously, approaches such as
Lenat’s (1995) Cyc project, have attempted to extend the application of reason
downward through the codification of general knowledge. This approach is
attempting to gain the connectionists’ ability to generalise through brute force.
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The missing link between these approaches is the ability to store or represent
complex knowledge in a generalised manner. This has been partially addressed in a
number of symbolic based methodologies by attempting to represent the context of
knowledge. For instance, Repertory Grids, Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) and
Ripple-Down Rules (RDR) all integrate either implicit or explicit contextual
information. However, these methodologies treat context as a static entity,
neglecting many connectionists’ work in learning hidden and dynamic contexts
and are still significantly limited in their ability to represent knowledge in a fully
generalised manner.
One of the most promising methods for modelling the central region of practice
though, as claimed by Gaines (2000), is through a system using multiple rule sets
based on exceptions within a prioritised hierarchy. Furthermore, Gaines (2000)
claims that Multiple Classification RDR (Kang and Compton 1992, 1994; Kang
et al. 1995) goes some way to providing such a knowledge base (KB) structure. The
multiple conclusions allow for a less rigid outcome, which permits the resolution of
conflicting constraints by providing a number of alternate possibilities. However,
such a system still only provides specific alternate classifications rather than a
general constraint, as Gaines (2000) claims is needed. Thus, a more general system
of selecting admissible actions that satisfy the identified constraints, but are
otherwise indeterminate, is more capable of realistically modelling human practice
(Gaines 2000).
Context
The strength of RDR based methods in partially addressing the problem of
modelling habitus, is based on their incremental nature, exception based knowledge
structure and the ability to capture static contexts. Context can be thought of as the
starting state or assumptions prior to inferencing. In the case of RDR, context is
determined during inferencing. This allows simple maintenance within the context
determined, through rule exceptions. This contextual based maintenance allows
RDR based methodologies to capture more transient and tacit knowledge (Richards
and Busch 2000, 2001). This is without the need to globalise knowledge to a general
context, where no prior knowledge or assumptions are required before codifying,
unlike many other KBS methodologies, such as Knowledge Acquisition and Design
Structuring (KADS).
This failure of most methodologies to consider context has significantly
hampered their knowledge acquisition process. However, methods, including
RDR based techniques, that do incorporate either implicit or explicit context,
assume that it is a priori, and therefore, deductive. This assumption leads to static
representations of contextual based knowledge. However, context in certain situa-
tions could be considered a posteriori, and therefore, inductive (Brezillon 1999). For
instance, during a conversation the context or assumptions of the people involved is
constantly altered as the interaction meanders through different topics. Each new
topic requires a different set of assumptions. Situations such as this require a
dynamic and changeable representation. Dynamic contexts require the ability to
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have multiple start states that result in the same or similar contexts. Alternatively, a
number of similar starting assumptions can result in many different contexts.
Brezillon (1999) suggests that dynamic context can only be modelled during the
solving of a problem or through interaction, and thus not directly coded in a static
structure. A number of authors, such as Widmer and Kubat (1996) go further,
suggesting that these new contexts are often differentiated by variables or facts that
are hidden, even to those altering their contextual position. Such contexts are
sometimes referred to as hidden contexts.
In this paper the idea of a hidden context is one that is only identifiable through
influences on a system that cannot be captured, such as human emotion or intuition.
These situations arise where aspects of a contextual situation are hidden from the
current state and the path taken to reach that position. A hidden context differs from
a dynamic context due to the contextual position being unknown, whereas dynamic
contexts are changing over time. Furthermore, the cause of a dynamically changing
context can potentially be due to the influence of a hidden context.
The dynamic, and generally hidden, contextual nature of habitus, potentially
prevents contextually static approaches from being able to encroach further into the
central region of practice. It is common knowledge that different people react
differently to particular events. Furthermore, the same person may react differently
to the same event at different times. For instance, people will often wait to tell
someone some news because they are ‘‘waiting for the right time.’’ This hidden and
dynamic context of habitus means facts about a situation will be interpreted
differently, resulting in a different response. Thus, the contextually static system’s
inability to incorporate this contextual information hinders their ability to accurately
model the process of practice.
Traditional View of Knowledge
Symbolic reasoning is built around the storage and codification of human
knowledge. Yet the question ‘‘what is knowledge?’’ is still very much an open
question. This section will investigate this question and what has resulted from the
different answers to this question. The traditional expert systems’ view of
knowledge was founded on the physical symbol hypothesis (Newell and Simon
1976), which takes the view that knowledge is comprised of symbols, and the
connections between those symbols, representing pieces of reality. Furthermore,
that intelligence comes from the appropriate manipulation of these symbols and
relationships. This AI perspective of knowledge is not new and closely draws from
the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Descartes, and ultimately Plato’s archetypes
(Compton and Jansen 1990; Compton 1992).
The result of the physical symbol hypothesis was that Expert System researchers
assumed that such symbols and relationships should be extractible and usable
without any further need of the expert. This fundamentally reductionist strategy was
the logical extension and led to the knowledge principle (Feigenbaum 1977; Lenat
and Feigenbaum 1988, 1991). The knowledge principle essentially suggested that
the success of an expert system is dependent on the amount of information about
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symbols and their relationships in the KB and not the inferencing or reasoning
strategy applied. Therefore, when difficulties arose, the common misconception was
that this came about from ineffective knowledge acquisition, and furthermore, that
experts do not ‘‘…communicate the underlying knowledge very well’’ (Compton
and Jansen 1990, p. 242). A closer investigation of these problems, however, reveals
three primary areas of difficulty:
• Knowledge base consistency.
Each additional symbol extracted from an expert, must be integrated into the
KB, such that no existing conclusions in the system, that are already correct, are
changed. Tools have been developed for validating and verifying knowledge
that can provide some assistance in a few systems. However, once identified, an
inconsistency still must be corrected and hand tailored by the Knowledge
Engineer (KE) (Compton and Jansen 1988).
• Inconsistent use of symbols by experts.
Shaw (1988) identified that experts frequently disagree on what is ‘‘correct
knowledge’’ when presented with it in the form of a KB. However, generally
these same experts have no problem discussing ideas with each other, even
though they apparently have conflicting views on the individual pieces
(Compton and Jansen 1988). This disagreement, however, can significantly
hamper knowledge acquisition.
• Experts’ justifications can be affected by the KE and the tool used.
People tend to describe concepts relative to a listener’s level of knowledge.
Furthermore, the contextual knowledge provided by an expert can often depend
on the framework of the questioner (Compton et al. 1991). Thus, a KE may ask a
question with certain expectations, which can be subtly conveyed to the expert,
who will tend to respond within that context.
The last two points challenge the original physical symbol hypothesis idea of
knowledge as being a static entity that can be extracted. These two points suggest
that the individual symbols can vary in meaning between experts and the
connections between those symbols vary according to the context in which the
knowledge is being used. This suggests that any form of static extraction of symbols
and connections ultimately is doomed to fail in all but the most rigid of knowledge
domains. The problems in knowledge acquisition originate not so much from the
extraction of the knowledge from the expert, but from the KE’s attempts to twist and
warp the acquired knowledge into a form suitable for the KBS in which they were
attempting to fit the knowledge.
Traditional Knowledge Representation
There have been numerous methodologies developed attempting to either, acquire
already globalised knowledge, or, of representing knowledge so that it facilitates the
easier inclusion of the gathered knowledge. These methods are primarily from, what
has been referred to as, second-generation ES. Second-generation ES moved away
from the more ad hoc KB structuring used in the earlier shell based systems, called
knowledge transfer (Newell and Simon 1976), towards a knowledge-level modelling
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(Siewiorek et al. 1982) approach. These new model-based ES approaches were
believed to provide a richer knowledge representation (KR) and, thus, the ability of
capturing deeper and different types of knowledge, such as tacit knowledge
(Richards 2001).
The majority of these methodologies, however, still view knowledge as static,
which once captured remains correct. They are in fact just new approaches to
facilitating the conversion of experts’ knowledge into a form that can be stored in
the KB. They generally do this by forcing the expert to provide their knowledge to
the engineer in a more structured approach, causing them to globalise their
knowledge at the point of extraction. This reduces the need for the engineer to
extensively convert the knowledge. While this is a significant improvement over the
ad-hoc approach, the fundamental problem is that it transfers part of the difficulty of
knowledge acquisition from the engineer to the expert, rather than actually solving
the root issue of KR. It would be preferable to simply store the knowledge in the
contextual form naturally gathered than requiring anyone having to globalise it first.
Traditional Knowledge Maintenance
While knowledge maintenance is presented here separately from KA and KR it is in
fact a microcosm of the same issues already described. It requires both the ability to
acquire new knowledge, as well as being able to insert it into the existing KB.
However, it usually presents as a much more difficult problem for ES developers.
There are three primary reasons for this added difficulty. First, the KE usually only
wants to make the minimal amount of changes when performing maintenance and does
not wish to restructure the entire KB. Second, often the original experts and engineers
are no longer as intimately involved with the project, making updating problematic.
Finally, the ES’s domain can often shift, including new areas not covered by the
existing system, after its deployment. Without a complete redevelopment this can
significantly increase maintenance problems, as found in the Xcon system (Bachant
and McDermott 1984). However, as the previous section briefly argued, KA, KR and
KM are not necessarily separate tasks and if a more holistic approach is used then the
difficulty created by these separate views can be resolved.
Knowledge Based Systems
There are numerous methodologies and tools that have been developed to aid in the
creation of KBSs, which attempt to address the KA problem. There are many books,
papers and reviews (such as Lenat and Guha 1990; Schreiber et al. 1993; Schreiber
1993; Leake 1996; Gennari et al. 2002) that investigate the issues associated with
the problem in detail. This section will only very briefly discuss two approaches
developed: KADS and Cyc.
Knowledge Acquisition and Design Structuring
Knowledge Acquisition and Design Structuring is the outcome of the European
research project ESPRIT-I P1098 initiated in 1983 with the aim of developing a
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comprehensive, commercially viable methodology for knowledge-based systems
(Wielinga et al. 1992). KADS is recognised as one of the first true methodologies
developed specifically for the development of KBSs and is still widely used today. It
was developed in particular to address the problems found in the knowledge
acquisition bottleneck. The researchers’ view of the problem was that knowledge
acquisition failed in traditional systems through an inability to get to the deep-
knowledge of the experts, primarily due to a lack of structural constraints on the
experts during knowledge extraction.
Rather than viewing KA as filling a container of knowledge, the KADS
perspective is an operational model that displays a form of observed behaviour
which is ‘‘…specified in terms of real world phenomena’’ (Wielinga et al. 1992, p.
6). Basically, KADS has an array of modelling techniques, where the expert and
engineer work together to build up a set of tasks so that knowledge acquisition can
be approached in a systematic way. This ensures, as best as possible, that nothing
gets left out and the people concerned are aware of where they are up to in the
process (Compton et al. 1993). This divide and conquer approach to KA is the basic
underpinning of all task orientated methodologies.
The reason approaches, such as KADS, work reasonably effectively during
development is because the expert themselves model a particular individual task.
This forces the expert to step out of their current context into the global knowledge
domain. This process of the expert now providing more globalised knowledge
prevents the engineer from being required to extensively convert the knowledge
further. However, the resulting KB is still global in context and static in
representation. Wielinga et al. (1992) even defines domain knowledge in KADS
as being static knowledge.
This static representation, however, leads to one of KADS greatest shortcomings:
knowledge maintenance. Nowhere in the KADS methodology, is the knowledge
maintenance issue addressed directly. Instead it assumes that the spiral life cycle
model will continue infinitum. This omission has resulted in alterations to the basic
methodology, such as structure preserving design (Schreiber 1993), which
preserves the information content and structure in the knowledge-level model,
within the final artefact. Therefore, the system not only provides the static domain
knowledge but also the relationships between the artefact and the original
knowledge sources and/or meta-classes. This makes development a process of
adding implementation detail to a knowledge-level model, which makes it more
possible to trace omissions or inconsistencies in an artefact back to the relevant part
of the model, considerably simplifying maintenance (Killin 1993; Schreiber 1993).
This essentially, although only in a limited form, can be seen as an attempt to
include some form of context within the symbols.
Cyc
Cyc, short for encyclopaedia, did not start out as an attempt to develop new
methodologies for knowledge acquisition. Rather, its intention was primarily to
solve the problem of brittleness, where a small amount of missing knowledge can be
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significantly detrimental to the system. However, as a result it has had implications
for both KA and KR methods. A KB’s brittleness comes from its concentration of
specialised knowledge within a single narrow domain. Therefore, when knowledge
is required from just beyond this domain the KBS collapses. Fundamentally, this is
part of the same problem the previous methodology was attempting to fix. KADS’s
unarticulated view had been if we can extract deeper knowledge then the system
will be less brittle. Lenat et al. (1990) however, argues that brittleness is the result of
insufficient commonsense knowledge within the KB. It is this lack of commonsense
knowledge that Cyc has been developed to address. The Cyc system is a universal
schema with millions of directly entered and inferred commonsense axioms that
make up hundreds of thousands of general concepts (Lenat 1995).
While methodological development was not the driving force behind Cyc, it was
one of the results. During the system’s development it was obvious that existing
methodologies were woefully inadequate at scaling to the required size or at
representing particular concepts. Cyc incrementally developed its own representa-
tion language then, to address repetition issues that eventuated, and periodically
smoothed out the resulting structure (Lenat et al. 1990). It uses a frame-based
language embedded in a first order predicate calculus framework with a series of
second-order extensions that allow the representation of defaults, reification, and for
reflection (Lenat et al. 1990; Pittman and Lenat 1993; Guha and Lenat 1994; Lenat
1995). The inference engine used for Cyc was also incrementally constructed using
more traditional computer science data-structures and algorithms.
Lenat (1995) argues that the majority of assertions could not be made correctly
without the use of some form of context. For instance, the statement ‘‘you cannot
see a persons heart’’ assumes that the person is not currently undergoing open heart
surgery. Alternatively, the assertion could also represent a metaphorical meaning.
Cyc’s solution was to place each assertion into one or more explicit contexts,
through the use of microtheories. Within each context, the assertion is then given its
default conclusion. Each context is itself an individual KB. Additionally, the
provision for being able to import assertions from other contexts was also included
in Cyc allowing the combination of contexts and contradictory assertions to be
resolved (Lenat et al. 1990; Lenat 1995).
The Cyc project’s brute force approach shows potential as a basis for domain
specific KBs to be built upon. However, Cyc’s ad-hoc development methodology
requires explicitly stated knowledge that can often be dated or invalidated by the
time it is eventually used in a real world system. This paper asserts that:
commonsense knowledge is one of the most a posteriori-contextually dependent
forms of knowledge, due to its high dependence on culture and time. For instance,
individual axioms not only change conclusions between contexts, but they also can
change within the same context between different culturally independent minority
groups. For instance, the common sense knowledge in Cyc is representative of
‘‘…TheWorldAsAGroupofWhiteWesternMiddleClassProfessionalMenBelieveItToBe
which may not be the same as TheWorldAsSomeOtherPeopleBelieveItToBe’’ (Adam
2000, p. 243). Furthermore, the contexts themselves within these groups also
changes over time. Adam (2000) exposes how ‘‘…culturally and temporally
variable common sense can be’’ (Adam 2000, p. 243), by pointing out it was
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‘‘…common sense in Victorian times to assume that higher education shrivelled
women’s reproduction organs’’ (Adam 2000, p. 243). These issues can be seen if we
look at one of Lenat et al’s (1990) own examples of knowledge in the Cyc system:
Payments of less than ten dollars are usually made with cash; those over 50
dollars are usually made via cheque or credit card (Lenat et al. 1990, p. 43).
Such an assertion is highly cultural, location and time specific and, therefore,
very susceptible to failing in a contextually-dynamic environment. For example,
given such knowledge, one must ask ‘‘how relevant is this?’’ to the following: a
peasant farmer in central china, who has no concept of how much a dollar is worth;
to people in a war zone that have no access to secure financial institutions; or, to
someone living in 2015 where all transactions are made with smart cards. Therefore,
even though various static-contexts are identified in Cyc, the absence of dynamic-
contexts renders its approach as far too simplistic and highly susceptible to
obsolescence, for the development of a (near) complete KB of common sense
knowledge. For instance, Clancey (1991) likens common sense knowledge to that of
chaos theory, where projects such as Cyc attempt to collect it like ‘‘…so many
butterflies’’ (Clancey 1991, p. 245).
Situated Cognition Applied to Artificial Intelligence
Problems such as inconsistent use of symbols and experts’ justifications being
affected by the context of the listener, oppose the original physical symbol
hypothesis idea of knowledge as being a static entity that can be extracted. This
returns us to the original question of ‘‘what is knowledge?’’ Situation Cognition
moves away from these traditional definitions of knowledge and instead argues that
knowledge is generated at the time of use and that context-independent assertions
cannot accurately model human cognition (Menzies 1996, 1998). The proponents of
Situated Cognition (SC) tend to fall into one of two camps.
1. Weak SC argues that when the human agent uses a particular description of
knowledge that they use the context of the current problem or situation to
continually reinterpret that description.
2. Strong SC takes a significant step further, claiming that context has such a potent
influence on the human agent that systems should be purely reactive and that we
should discard symbolic representations altogether (Menzies 1996, 1998).
Therefore, SC, in its weak and most common interpretation, views knowledge
instead as being mostly context based (Menzies 1996). SC and its subfields, situated
automata (Maes 1990; Waldrop 1990) and situated action (Agre 1990; Suchman
1987), are philosophically justifiable through work such as Bartlett (1932), Piaget
(1970), Jenkins (1974) and Bransford et al. (1977). SC attacks the Platonic view of
knowledge and memory and instead claims that knowledge is re-constructed each
time it is needed (Agre 1990; Compton and Kang 1993; Maes 1990; Clancey 1991).
This dynamic re-construction of knowledge involves the combination of two
factors: firstly, where the agent has come from to reach this particular point, and the
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location of the agent’s eventual goal. For instance, Clancey provides the example
that ‘‘…at a base level a person is always like a dancer balancing [his/]her next
steps against the inertia of past movements and [his/]her view of where s[/]he is
going’’ (Clancey 1991, p. 244).
Knowledge Acquisition in Context
A new perspective on knowledge does not necessarily imply that the method by
which knowledge is acquired needs to be reconsidered. Essentially, all that SC does
is allow a KE to view the knowledge they gather differently. The problems
identified for knowledge acquisition in Sect. ‘‘Traditional View of Knowledge’’ did
not originate from the extraction of knowledge from the expert, but from the KE
attempts to globalise the acquired knowledge into a form suitable for the KBS.
Therefore, the key to improved KBS development is not so much in how knowledge
is acquired, but how that knowledge should be represented.
Representing Knowledge in Context
As discussed earlier the traditional physical symbol hypothesis views extracted
knowledge as unchanging. Therefore, ES methodologies can only build KBs with a
static KR. The SC view of knowledge, however, indicates that knowledge is relative
to the context it was re-constructed, and therefore, changeable. Thus, to truly reduce
the problem of KA, a representation that incorporates context should be used. It
follows then that a KR methodology that intends to incorporate context, must be
able to assimilate change. This does not negate the possibility of specifying a KB
prior to its application, but it does mean that the previously specified store of
knowledge should be dynamically alterable.
Ideally a system should have a KR technique that is sufficiently flexible that it
could change knowledge or include the context of the supplied knowledge. This
would allow knowledge extracted from an expert to be significantly more easily
included within the KB and, thereby, preventing the need for either the KE or expert
to interweave knowledge into a global perspective. This would significantly
simplify the problems associated with knowledge acquisition, as the conversion
from contextualised knowledge to globalised knowledge would no longer be
required.
Maintaining Knowledge in Context
Menzies (1998) identifies one of the primary changes in knowledge engineering
brought about due to the SC view as a new emphasis on maintenance rather than
design. This is due to the context in which knowledge can be located is often only
identifiable in an online environment during the maintenance phase. This directly
challenges the approach of second generation KBS methodologies like KADS,
which focus on design and do not even discuss maintenance in the core set of tasks.
Menzies (1998) suggests that one approach to situated knowledge engineering is to
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build two KBs. The first captures system knowledge like any other KB, while the
second models the impact of the first KB on its environment and vice versa. For
example, the BRAHMS system by Clancey et al. (1998) and REMAP by Ramesh
and Dhar (1992) both attempt to model the environment around a KB. Another
approach is to directly represent the context of the knowledge being stored within
the KB itself. This context can either be stored implicitly or explicitly. For instance,
the Cyc ad-hoc approach uses microtheories, which allows for a form of explicit
contextual information to be included in the KB.
Contextual Knowledge-Based Systems
There are only a limited number of tools and methodologies that have been
developed to aid in the creation of KBS through the incorporation of context. This
section will briefly introduce some widely used approaches; namely, FCA,
Repertory Grids and RDR.
Formal Concept Analysis in Contextual Knowledge Acquisition
Formal Concept Analysis, originally developed by Wille (1981), is based on lattice
theory. FCA is not a KA methodology, rather it is mathematical tool used for the
discovery of concepts. It was designed to provide a basic answer to two fundamental
questions in relation to a concept; how to appropriately classify objects within a
particular context, and what the dependencies are between attributes (Wille 1981).
Its relevance to KBS comes from its representation theory and how that can be used
in KR.
Formal Concept Analysis is rooted in the philosophical idea of a concept as a
single unit of thought that is made up of two components: extent, which covers all
objects (entities) belonging to a particular concept; and intent, which comprises the
attributes (properties) that are valid for all those objects (Wille 1981). Put another
way, a formal context, K, is a triple K(G, M, I) containing the set of objects G1
forming the extension of the concept, and a set of attributes M2 represent the
intention of the concept, which are linked together by the binary relation I (Richards
1998a; Wille 1981).
The advantage in the FCA approach is that lattice theory provides a simple
mathematical vocabulary for discussing order, and especially when used in systems
where there is a natural sense of hierarchies (Birkhoff 1938), due to its theory of
substructures (Wille 1981). This advantage results in the ability of a complete
lattice, called a concept lattice or semantic net, providing a conceptual clustering of
objects via the extents as well as a representation of the implications between the
attributes via the intents (Wille 1992). It is this ability to express all relationships
between attributes, describe objects in terms of the concepts contained and to show
the relationships between those concepts, which makes FCA a powerful represen-
tation for knowledge (Richards 1998a).
1 G stands for Gegenstande in German.
2 M stands for Merkmale in German.
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Generally, FCA has not been used as a KR methodology by itself. Instead it has
been used for knowledge acquisition (1992; Wille 1989) in many KBS based areas,
such as CBR (Diaz-Agudo and Gonzalez-Calero 2001) and ontology construction
and maintenance (Stumme et al. 2000), as a means for discovering knowledge
embedded in cases through these identified relationships. Within these areas FCA
has been highly effective at extracting contextual knowledge.
Clancey (1991) mentions, however, that although semantic network based
approaches can embody a cognitive model that show human-like behaviour, they
are limited to a ‘‘…grammatical model of cognition’’ (Clancey 1991, p. 251).
Therefore, they fail to capture non-verbal concepts or to ‘‘…model the perceptual-
conceptual learning…’’ (Richards 1998a, p. 155) evident in humans’ attachment of
meaning to a grammar (Richards 1998a). Clancey (1991) continues by pointing out
that concepts are being regarded as things rather than the ‘‘…processes of
perceiving and processes of behaving’’ (Clancey 1991, p. 252). Additionally, Wille
(1981) himself identifies the method’s lack of scalability for the inclusion of all
relevant attributes and relationships with large contexts, potentially limiting its use.
Personal Construct Psychology and Repertory Grids
Kelly’s (1955) book ‘‘Psychology of Personal Constructs’’ introduces his personal
construct theory (also referred to as Personal Construct Psychology, PCP), where he
postulates that ‘‘A person’s processes are psychologically channelled by the way in
which he anticipates events’’ (Kelly 1955, p. 46). Basically, he viewed all people as
their own personal scientist at anticipation, where an anticipatory model of the
environment was reflexively applied to the self (Shaw and Gaines 1992). Shaw and
Gaines saw PCP as a ‘‘…constructivist position in modelling human knowl-
edge…that characterises conceptual structures in axiomatic terms’’ (Shaw and
Gaines 1992, p. 31).
Kelly’s (1955) emphasis is on the space created by the process of making
distinctions rather than being defined by the elements identified. Within this
psychological space a construct is like a single plane that slices through a large
collection of events (Kelly 1970). Fundamentally, a construct contains a triple of
two disjoint distinctions that are mutually subsumed by the third, referred to as the
range of convenience or the subsuming concept (Richards 1998a, b). Essentially, the
disjoint pair bound the extremes of the range of convenience or concepts. Therefore,
this provides a means for bounding concepts, allowing knowledge acquisition to
start with a more encompassing view and acquire knowledge inwardly; rather than
the traditional approach, of starting at the centre and acquiring knowledge
outwardly.
In order to actually acquire the relevant constructs and elements for a domain,
Kelly also developed the repertory grid technique (Richards 1998a, b). It is
designed to bypass a person’s cognitive defence and provide an avenue to their
underlying construction system by asking them to compare and contrast various
examples. Thus, repertory grids use the idea that people are more able to offer
context based examples than defining globally based rules. Essentially, the repertory
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grid is a method of finding concepts, the structures within those concepts and the
relationships between those structures without eliciting them directly. This can be
more effective than the conventionally based methodologies that directly extracted
models (Richards 1998a).
Kelly’s repertory grid technique has had widespread success in a number of
domains and continues to be applied in both manual and computerised applications.
Some systems that use the repertory grid are the Knowledge Support System Zero
(KSS0), Expertise Transfer System and AQUINAS (Boose et al. 1989). Gaines and
Shaw (1993) also have provided a general framework to assist users in the
elicitation of the conceptual structures when using repertory grids (Richards 1998a).
Personal Construct Psychology is similarly simple in its acquisition of knowledge
to RDR. Both view the concept of model derivation as being difficult and
problematic, preferring the simpler technique of eliciting knowledge directly from
an expert without the need of a KE. However, the captured knowledge is different,
in that RDR develops an assertional KBS, while PCP captures a conceptual model
from which a terminological KBS can be extrapolated (Richards 1998a). As
discussed in Sect. 3.4.1, Richards (1998a, b) developed a combination of RDR and
FCA in order to create a terminological KBS with RDR.
Ripple-Down Rules
Compton et al. (1988, 1989) extended Popper’s (1963) theory of hypotheticode-
ductive reasoning to the application of knowledge engineering. He suggested that
experts do not provide information on their insight or how they reached a particular
conclusion; but instead, they provide a justification for excluding the other possible
hypotheses from within a particular context (Compton and Jansen 1988, 1990;
Compton et al. 1988, 1989). It was suggested that these dichotomies between insight
and justification (Compton et al. 1988, 1989) arise from a traditional misinterpre-
tation of the form of knowledge provided by experts. This new hypothesis for
knowledge engineering has resulted in the development and deployment of a new
collection of methodologies and applications based on the knowledge acquisition
and inferencing philosophy of RDR.
The original impetus for the development of RDR came from Compton et al’s
(1988, 1989) work on the GARVAN-ES1 expert system and the maintenance issues
that arose. Through this maintenance experience, Compton et al. (1988, 1989) found
that in order to create a maintainable ES through dialogue with domain experts, then
the system should build into its methodology a means for incorporating an expert’s
justification of a hypothesis within a particular context.
The resulting methodology developed, RDR, uses a simple exception structure
aimed at partially capturing the context that knowledge is obtained from an
expert. It was assumed that the context was the sequence of rules that had
evaluated to provide the given conclusion (Beydoun 2000; Compton and Jansen
1988; Compton et al. 1991; Preston et al. 1993, 1994). Therefore, if the expert
disagrees with a conclusion made by the system they can change it by adding a
new rule with whichever level of generality was required by the expert. However,
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the new rule will only fire if the same path of rules is evaluated with the same
outcomes as previously (Compton et al. 1993). Since its development it has
accurately been described as knowledge acquisition through fault patching
(Menzies and Debenham 2000). RDR was so named to capture this notion of
appending fix-up rules to the bottom of a KB, thereby, rippling the formula for a
conclusion down over many rules, rather than attempting to fix existing rules
(Jansen and Compton 1989).
The context of a new rule is its position within the RDR structure. A rule can
only fire when the rules that led to it, before its creation, have fired. Therefore, the
rules context is the previous path of rules and their outcomes. This is effectively
capturing the rules context implicitly within the structure itself. This corresponds to
how a human expert, explaining the justification of their conclusion to a trainee, will
start from where they believe the trainee deviated from the correct solution,
providing the justifications required from that point to the expert’s correct
conclusion. Furthermore, it also corresponds to a person’s method of debate or
argument. When debating an issue each person presents their view but they start
their justifications from the current context of their opponents.
Ripple-Down Rules’ very simple no-model approach to KA has revealed many
advantages. For instance, because a rule can only fire within a particular context,
then when it is being created it only requires validation within that context (Dazeley
2007). Therefore, new knowledge can easily be validated during the moment of
acquisition. Furthermore, the expert does not need to know anything about the
actual underlying structure of the knowledge they are constructing. This is a marked
difference from model based approaches where the KE needs to consider and
validate each new piece of knowledge across the entire KB. In this system the
normal KB development phases of requirements definition, analysis, design,
implementation and maintenance can be eliminated. RDR omits the design stage
completely and merges the implementation and maintenance phases seamlessly
(Beydoun 2000), effectively providing a holistic approach to KA and KM where
there is little or no difference between the tasks.
Hidden and Dynamic Context Applied to Artificial Intelligence
The application of ideas from weak situation cognition has already shown great
potential to significantly improve Knowledge Acquisition and maintenance in many
domains. However, in its weak form SC assumes context is static and once found
can be codified. This is once again falling into the same trap that KBS developers
did when using the physical symbol hypothesis. This assumption simplifies the
problem domain allowing KBS developers to ignore more difficult unsolved
situations. This is fine when used in situations where context is for the most part
static, such as well defined areas like medical diagnostics. However, in many real
world situations, such as general knowledge, this abstraction reduces the potential of
such methodologies being successfully applied.
The more radical view of strong SC agrees that the process of abstraction and
representation simplifies the environment too much. Brooks (1991) claims that
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giving a computer a human Merkwelt3 is flawed because it is based on our own
introspection. There is no evidence that what we perceive as our Merkwelt is in fact
what occurs internally and ‘‘…it could just as easily be an output coding for
communication purposes’’ (Brooks 1991, p. 141). Brooks (1991) identifies two
primary problems with the use of the human Merkwelt. The computer, robot, or
software agent does not perceive the world in the same way a human does.
Furthermore, even if it did, there is no guarantee the human introspectively derived
Merkwelt is correct.
While these arguments for strong SC are legitimate, the conclusion to reject all
symbolic representation is flawed. As noted by various authors (Anderson 1990;
Menzies 1996, 1998; Patel and Ramoni 1997; Vera and Simon 1993a, b, c) there are
numerous examples showing that the symbolic based descriptions of experts are
richer and more abstract than those of novices (Menzies 1998). Therefore, these
descriptions must represent some interpretable meaning. However, what the strong
SC argument shows is that weak SC based KBSs still suffer from an over
simplification of the environment being represented.
It can, however, be argued that a middle ground could be taken. Given the weak
SC argument that knowledge is constantly reinterpreted in the context of the
problem, then it is possible to expand upon this notion by elaborating on ‘‘what is
context?’’ Context in the Cyc, PCP, FCA and RDR have all assumed context to be
a priori known and, therefore, identifiable, codifiable and static. For instance, when
driving a car in Australia you should give way at an intersection to cars coming
from the right. Likewise, cars to your left will give-way to you. However, if one of
the cars to your left is an emergency vehicle with its siren blaring then you also
give-way. Therefore, the different context in this case is the presence of the
emergency vehicle. These two contexts are static, because the knowledge used in
each is constant and does not change.
Strong SC, however, claims that the effect of context is overpowering, rendering
such work as futile. For instance, long term weather prediction is inaccurate due to
the existence of so many factors making up the forecast. Each combination of these
factors represents a different context. Strong SC does not, however, alter the
underlying notion that context is an influence; just that it has a greater affect than
weak SC claims. Nor does it adequately define context or detail why some form of
symbolic representation does not aid learning to some degree. Thus, a middle
ground reinterpretation of SC, referred to as Intermediate SC, should provide an
elaboration on the types of context possible. Building on from the weak SC claim:
Intermediate SC suggests that humans continually reinterpret a particular
description of knowledge based on their current situation, which is dynam-
ically alterable due to hidden contexts from within their Merkwelt.
An interpretation of SC such as Intermediate Situation Cognition still allows for
symbolic reasoning but indicates that it should be able to handle different
3 Merkwelt is the term used by Jakob von Uexkull in his 1934 paper ‘A Stroll through the Worlds of
Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds’, to refer to the complete set of environmental
factors that have an affect on a species regardless of whether they are perceptible or not.
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reinterpretations of the same knowledge in the same context. For instance, a
blackjack player’s decision to draw a card when on seventeen is only partly based
on the mathematical odds. Numerous factors from within their Merkwelt could also
be affecting their choice. For example, they may think there are many smaller cards
than usual left in the deck or they may simply have a feeling. In this situation the
Merkwelt is being influenced by hidden emotional or subconscious states or
contexts, which alters their response from previous times they have had the same
hand. This outwardly produces what appears to be a dynamic contextual response,
because a different action was taken for the same context, the hand dealt.
Some may claim, however, that dynamic context is represented in the
contextually-static methodologies, through breaking down a drifting context into
a series of discrete static representations. However, this is abstracting a level of
complexity from a domain that could contain important information. It is also
turning a domain into a ‘‘blocks world’’ type of toy problem. It is this over
simplification that Strong SC, and therefore intermediate SC, truly opposes.
Furthermore, recognition of hidden and dynamic contexts is certainly not new.
For instance, Arbib (1993) alludes to the existence of hidden contexts in schema
theory, in that ‘‘…no single, central, logical representation of the world need link
perception and action’’ (Arbib 1993, p. 273). Widmer and Kubat’s (1996) FLORA
system was designed with the idea that contexts may be hidden and unrealised.
One of the most widely researched areas of dynamic context is in the Information
Filtering research stream, dealing with the issue of concept drift. Fundamentally,
there is little difference between a user’s concept and the context of their behaviour.
The concept is the idea behind a user’s action, whereas, the context represents the
circumstances of an event. Thus, the user’s concept governs the circumstances of
the event, and therefore, the current context. Consequently, as the user’s concept
drifts, often dynamically, so does the context.
Implications for Knowledge Engineering and Maintenance
The idea of introducing hidden and dynamic contexts into KBS research could
potentially aid in understanding many of the historical and current problems in
knowledge engineering and the maintenance of such systems. The fundamental
issue, however, is how does a symbolic representation capture such information.
Once a symbol is captured as a piece of knowledge, we not only are required to store
a contextual relationship in parallel with that knowledge, we must also be able to
alter it dynamically. Additionally, we should be able to find new contexts not
expressed by an expert.
Conclusion
This paper discussed how existing approaches to AI have failed to adequately model
the area of human reasoning that psychology and sociology refer to as the process of
practise. It is this failure that has significantly contributed to brittleness in symbolic
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reasoning. This paper investigated how the process of practise relates to deeper
forms of contextual representations of knowledge.
This paper briefly outlined two philosophies of knowledge. The first, physical
symbol hypothesis and its later, less ad hoc, form of knowledge-level modelling were
discussed. The primary difficulty in these views was the conversion from
contextually based to globally based knowledge and that these methodologies are
inherently static in nature. Also discussed were a number of methodologies that use
this interpretation of knowledge and how this presented further difficulties during
knowledge acquisition and especially maintenance.
The emergence of a SC view of knowledge addressed these issues, which was the
second philosophy discussed. It was identified that KR methodologies need to be
used that allow for dynamically changing knowledge. RDR is one methodology that
has attempted to meet this SC view. Other methodologies that also use SC as their
underlying philosophy, such as PCP and FCA were discussed.
These systems have performed exceptionally well in many areas where
knowledge-level systems have repeatedly failed. Nevertheless, strong SC literature
argues that such systems will not achieve true robustness and intelligence as context
is too problematic to be represented symbolically. Finally, this paper has suggested
a clarification to what forms context can appear and suggest that for symbolic
systems to succeed they must embrace all these contextual forms and that this meets
the concerns of Strong SC. This has resulted in the presentation of a new
interpretation of SC for AI referred to as Intermediate Situation Cognition which
makes a significant step towards an epistemology that could lead to the modelling of
the process of practise.
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